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Abstract 
We show analytically that the credibility problem which has affected the European Stability Pact originates 
from the insufficient distinction between two reasons for having binding fiscal constraints. The first reason 
deals with the governments’ tendency to neglect the effects of their fiscal policy on foreign governments 
(fiscal free-riding). The second reason follows from the governments’ tendency to raise debt by lowering 
taxes or increasing expenditures, and then to leave it to their successors (fiscal short-termism). An 
enforcement mechanism relying on governments’ collusion works if the fiscal constraints are not calibrated 
for curing fiscal short-termism but only for preventing fiscal free-riding. 
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“You can’t set the fox to guard the hen-house”  
1.   INTRODUCTION 
On November 25, 2003, the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) decided “not to act 
on the basis of the Commission Recommendations” and agreed “to hold the Excessive Deficit Procedure for 
Germany and France in abeyance”. The European Commission “deeply regretted that the Council had not 
followed the spirit and the rules of the Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) that were agreed 
unanimously by all Member States” and underlined that “only a rule-based system can guarantee that 
commitments are enforced and that all Member States are treated equally”. The European Court of Justice 
annulled the decisions of the ECOFIN Council, although confirming that the latter has the right to exercise 
discretion in the implementation of the Excessive Deficit Procedure. On March 20, 2005, ECOFIN adopted 
a report on “improving the implementation of the SGP”, which was subsequently endorsed by the European 
Council. This report now forms part of the SGP. This reform makes the surveillance of budgetary positions 
more adaptable to country-specific circumstances, allowing each member state to present a country-specific 
medium-term objective which may diverge from the close to balance or in surplus requirement which was 
prescribed by the original SGP. Moreover, the reform introduces more flexibility and discretion in 
subjecting governments to the excessive deficit procedure and in requiring corrective actions. The reform 
was unanimously perceived as the confirming evidence that most European governments were not willing to 
comply with the severe fiscal discipline imposed by the original SGP.1  
This sequence of events demonstrated what several critics had envisaged, i.e. that the Pact lacked 
credibility because the institutional design of its enforcement mechanism was inconsistent with the aims that 
it intended to pursue. The present paper focuses on this point and leaves aside other issues that were recently 
raised, going from the alleged insufficient room conceded by the Pact to the working of automatic stabilizers 
and discretionary fiscal policies to the opportunity of changing the budget indicators targeted by the Pact. In 
this way, the value added of our paper amounts to showing analytically that at the root of the SGP’s 
credibility problem there is the insufficient awareness that the governments’ attitudes towards the SGP 
                                                          
1
 In particular, the European Central Bank expressed immediately its deep concern about the effects of the reform: “The 
Governing Council of the ECB is seriously concerned about the proposed changes to the Stability and Growth Pact” 
(Statement of the Governing Council of 21 March 2005). 
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reflect the two different reasons that justify the need of binding fiscal constraints in such a context. The first 
reason has to do with the temptation of any single national government to free riding, namely to deciding its 
fiscal policy irrespectively of its implications for the foreign governments. The second reason deals with the 
inevitable short-termism of elected governments to which it appears attractive to lower taxes or increase 
expenditures by raising debt, and then leave it to their successors. If fiscal constraints are calibrated so as to 
internalize the negative externalities that issuing too much debt generates on foreign governments, an 
enforcement mechanism depending on the collective willingness of the governments to sanction defiant 
behavior can work: cooperative behavior on the part of any single fiscal authority is in the common interest 
of all governments. In contrast, if fiscal constraints are set so as to implement in all member states a fiscal 
policy that is optimal from a long-term point of view, one cannot leave the enforcement of such constraints 
to the representatives of the member governments (the ECOFIN): sharing a short-term perspective, national 
governments would collude to elude these fiscal constraints. The conclusion is that the provisions of the  
SGP are consistent with the objective of enforcing cooperative behavior among national governments, but 
not with the additional objective of having all member countries caring of the long-term welfare effects of 
current fiscal policies. This more ambitious objective would require that the authority enforcing the respect 
of the fiscal constraints be independent—as the European Central Bank (ECB)—of the national 
governments.  
The analysis is conducted within an overlapping generations (OLG) framework, where national 
governments are concerned  about the welfare of the living (and voting!) generations only and finance the 
provision of a public good entering the households’ utility function by taxing the households’ labor income 
and assets’ gross returns, and by raising debt. In the presence of internationally integrated markets, national 
fiscal policies determine spillovers affecting the welfare of the households living in other countries. This 
creates a situation of interdependence among national fiscal policies, that we model as a n-governments 
dynamic game. We derive the Nash-Cournot (subgame-perfect) equilibrium path of the game in which each 
national government acts non-cooperatively and compare it to the path emerging when national governments 
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act cooperatively.2 All governments are better off under cooperation: it is in their collective interest to 
enforce cooperative behavior. It is beyond the scope of this paper to elaborate on the design of an 
appropriate mechanism for the enforcement of intergovernmental cooperation, since our objective is to 
demonstrate that --while it is in the interest of short-sighted national governments to enforce a “Pact” that 
prevents some government from damaging the other governments--it is not in their interests to enforce a 
“Pact” that prevents some government from damaging the future generations. Indeed, we derive the path 
emerging if a benevolent planner, caring also of the future generations’ welfare, could decide both current 
and future fiscal policies, and we show that short-sighted national governments would never enforce a 
“Pact” dictating such fiscal policies.  
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 motivates the model structure in the light of the relevant 
literature; section 3 presents the model; section 4 characterizes the equilibrium paths emerging under 
authorities’ short-termism; section 5 characterizes the equilibrium path emerging when a benevolent planner 
cares also about the future generations’ welfare;  section 6 concludes.  
 
2.  MOTIVATIONS AND RELEVANT LITERATURE  
It has been noted that fiscal rules may act both as disciplinary and coordinating devices (see Pisani-
Ferry, 2002) and that these two aspects are closely intertwined in the SGP (see Allsopp and Artis, 2003). 
However, no other formal analysis—to our knowledge—focuses on how this duplicity can originate the 
serious credibility problem which affects the SGP.  
In assessing the reasons for having binding fiscal rules in the European Monetary Union (EMU), the 
ECB has recently stated: “The main rationale for constraining fiscal policies via rules lies in the temptation 
for governments to spend more than they can afford and pass the burden onto future taxpayers. If unchecked, 
this results in a deficit bias where high deficits lead to growing debt levels that can cast a permanent shadow 
over economic prospects. High deficits and debt result in higher long-term interest rates and lower private 
investment as they compete for private savings. This can lead to a permanent loss of output over the long 
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run” (ECB, 2005, p. 65). Economic theory has explained the need of imposing disciplinary constraints to the 
governments’ discretionary powers in fiscal policy by emphasizing the political distortions that generate 
excessive accumulation of public debt. These distortions come from the short-term bias that affects 
politicians because of their desire to please their constituency before elections or to impose heavy burdens to 
their successors, or because of their awareness that they may not be in office when the benefits of their fiscal 
restraint will be enjoyed (e.g. Nordhaus, 1975; Persson and Svensson, 1989; Alesina and Tabellini, 1990; 
Gersbach, 1998). Obviously, this short-termism makes sense only in a world where the Barro-Ricardo 
equivalence does not hold, namely in a world where private agents have finite lives and do not fully care 
about the well-being of their descendants, or are bequest constrained, or suffer from incomplete information 
or from bounded rationality (thus being subject to “fiscal illusion”) (e.g. Blanchard, 1985; Cukierman and 
Meltzer, 1989; Persson and Tabellini, 1990; Buti and van den Noord, 2003).  
In this context, the function of binding fiscal rules is to prevent politicians from an excessive use of 
the public debt aimed at reducing the burden of taxation in the present by redistributing it over time and 
across generations. Therefore, this function related to the intertemporal dimension of fiscal policy exists 
independently of the possible presence of inter-country spillovers. In principle, each country could 
implement its own institutional arrangements in order to overcome the deficit bias inherent in the political 
process.3 As an application of the principle of subsidiarity, there is no need that rules designed for protecting 
the citizens of a country from the long-term costs of fiscal misbehaviour by their elected politicians be 
managed at the supra-national level (see Allsopp and Artis, 2003). However, it was argued that the 
constraints of the SGP have been seen--especially by those countries with a history of persistently high 
public deficit and more in need of fiscal consolidation--as an external disciplinary device that could help 
controlling the internal pressures toward a more loose fiscal stance (see Allsopp and Vines, 1998). As a 
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matter of fact, this use of the EU’s authority to protect the European citizens from the short-term bias of 
their own national policy makers is not in keeping with the institutional design of the SGP, according to 
which national governments “are supposed to apply the rules to themselves, thereby having incentives for 
collusion and horse-trading” (Buti et al., 2003, p. 106). If this is the case, the ceilings dictated by the Pact 
are bound to be time inconsistent: the fiscal deficits of short-sighted governments will systematically exceed 
them.     
In modeling the inevitable tension between the short-term objectives of elected governments and the 
long-term welfare implications of fiscal policy, we adopt an OLG set-up without bequests, which allows us 
to define precisely what is the optimal sequence of the debt-to-GDP ratio dictated by a benevolent planner 
caring also about the well-being of the future generations, and to contrast it with the fiscal policies decided 
by short-sighted governments. Hence, the planned sequence of deficit targets consistent with the optimal 
path implemented by the benevolent planner should be considered a reasonable approximation of those 
fiscal policies conducive to strong sustainable growth which represent the stated objective of the SGP. 
Indeed, even if the SGP does not refer to the numerical ceilings that it dictates as “optimal” levels, these 
ceilings go well beyond what is needed for solvency or sustainability and are justified because of their 
desirable long-term implications.4 Finally--given that the analysis focuses on the long-term implications of 
fiscal policy--we have opted for a non-monetary framework, consistently with the hypothesis that money 
cannot affect real variables in the long run.   
 As far as the coordinating role  of binding fiscal rules is concerned, this is also clearly stated by the 
ECB according to which: “As national financial markets become more integrated, sovereign issuers can 
draw on a larger and more liquid currency area-wide capital market. A government that increases its deficits 
will be able to finance the additional expenditure more easily because the cost of the additional borrowing in 
terms of higher interest rates is, at least partly, spread across the entire currency area. Consequently, the 
spillover effects from deficit spending in one country on other countries are also greater in EMU, making 
the participant Member States’ fiscal policies all the more a matter of common concern” (ECB, 2005, pp. 
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65-66).  As emphasized by Fatás and Mihov (2003), most of the literature on international policy 
coordination starts with the assumption that, in the absence of some arrangement enforcing cooperation 
among national policy makers, domestic fiscal policies are run optimally taking into consideration internal 
conditions, but they fail to internalize the externalities they impose on other countries. This is the case of 
Kehoe (1987) and Chari and Kehoe (1990, 2003), where each national government maximizes the welfare of 
both its current (and future residents) and imposes externalities on other countries by crowding out the 
world capital stock, by affecting world prices or by inducing the common central bank to raise the inflation 
rate. The two-period model presented by Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) moves away from a set-up where, in the 
absence of international coordination, domestic fiscal policies are run optimally except for their failure to 
internalize the externalities they cause, since it shares with our framework the point of view that 
governments are short-sighted. In their model, the fact that in a monetary union the accumulation of higher 
debt by an individual government has negative spillovers on the other member countries (since it induces the 
common central bank to raise the inflation rate) creates an incentive for all the governments of the union to 
enforce a Pact curing the distortions caused by governments’ short-termism.5 However, Beetsma and Uhlig 
(1999) do not focus on the problems arising when  the Pact to be enforced by national governments has the 
twofold scope of avoiding  negative externalities on other governments and of offsetting the detrimental 
long-term effects that each short-sighted government causes on its residents. Moreover, using a two-period 
set-up without capital accumulation, they cannot capture the consequences on long-term growth of the fiscal 
policies conducted by short-sighted politicians. Similarly, the static model presented by Uhlig (2002) to 
analyze the interdependence among national debt policies does not treat the intertemporal tradeoffs 
originated by the fiscal authorities’ possibility of running deficits. In contrast, Beltrametti and Bonatti 
(2004) is consistent with the spirit of the present paper, since it deals with the international coordination of 
pension policies decided by short-sighted national authorities in a context where pension policies can 
influence national savings and the world capital stock.  
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In this paper, we are concerned with the long-term implications of current fiscal policies and focus on 
their impact on capital formation; in this context monetary policy is of second order importance. Moreover, 
it is well known that the inter-country spillovers of fiscal policies may be relevant within an integrated 
economic area, no matter whether the area has an unique currency. Therefore, using a simplified framework, 
we assume internationally integrated capital markets and allow crowding out of the world capital formation 
due to spillovers caused by national fiscal policies. 
Turning to the evidence on capital market integration, the ECB reports that the unexplained yield 
variance of the EU government bond market--once common factors are taken into account--dropped from 
50% in 1997 to 5% in 2000, confirming that integration rose with the common currency (ECB, 2003). The 
European corporate bond market also underwent significant changes: from 1998 to 2003 its outstanding 
value almost tripled and, most importantly, such an increase was brought about by the participation of 
industrial corporations whose proportion rose from 3% to almost 40%.  In addition, the share of assets 
invested in bond funds with a Europe-wide investment strategy, rose, in the international portfolio of 
institutional investors, from 17% in 1998 to 80% in 2003, again signalling the fostering role played by the 
common currency (Baele et al., 2004).   
For crowding out to take place however a significant response of the real interest rate to changes in 
the deficit is also required. The budget deficit surge of the Bush’s administration and the more flexible Pact 
in Europe, have spurred some additional significant literature on this topic, although it goes without saying  
that disentangling the debt and deficit effects from those of other factors remains a complicated matter. For 
the USA, Laubach (2003) estimates that one percentage point increase in the projected deficit-to-GDP ratio  
raises long-term interest rates by roughly 25 basis points.6 Again for the USA, Rubin et al. (2004) relay on 
several estimates to conclude that private savings offset about a quarter of the public saving decline and that 
                                                          
6
 The President’s Council of Economic Advisers suggests that a sustained increase in the deficit equal to one percent of 
GDP would raise interest rates by 30 basis points. Results from some macro-econometric models, including the FRB/US 
model used at the Federal Reserve, shows an effect larger than 60 basis points. 
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about one third of the decline in national saving is offset by capital inflows from abroad; the rest is reflected 
in a reduction in domestic investment7.  
Ford and Laxton (1999), considering eight OECD countries find that the OECD-wide debt to GDP 
ratio and the OECD-wide government consumption  to GDP ratio  explain a large proportion of  the variance 
of the national real interest rates on government bonds while the role of domestic factors is more 
controversial (Breedon et al. 1999). However, Perotti (2002) using a VAR model for USA, UK, Canada 
West Germany and Australia finds that random discretionary fiscal policy shocks have an ambiguous effect 
on the short term nominal and real interest rate. As Perotti admits, this ambiguity may be due to the use of  
the  short-term real interest rate where the long term one might be more appropriate. This view is shared by 
Rubin et al. (2004), who further observe that in addition of using the long term interest rate, the expected 
budget deficit should also be taken into account  since financial markets are forward-looking8. 
For the European Union, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998) argue that the effect of a country’s 
borrowing on the interest rates union-wide is not relevant, while Welsch (2000) finds that the spillovers of 
domestic fiscal policies occur mainly through the interest rate channel. Along the same line the ECB (2004) 
recognises the impact that a rising demand for funds due to increasing public deficits can have on the capital 
market and other relevant effects ascribable to the expected deficits and debts. More recently Faini (2006) 
using a panel of 10 EMU members for the period 1979-2002 finds evidence of significant spillover effects 
within the eurozone: an expansionary fiscal policy in one member country impacts more on the EMU real 
interest rates than on the country interest rate spread. These results confirm those of Chinn and Frenkel 
(2005) who show that the European long term real interest rate positively depends upon the debt ratio and 
the expected debt ratio. At the OECD level Ardegna at al. (2004), using a dynamic VAR on a panel of 16 
countries from 1960 to 2002, find that a percentage point rise of the deficit to GDP ratio increases the long 
term interest rate by as much as 150 basis points after 10 years, while the public debt to GDP ratio has a 
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 In other words, an increase in the budget deficit of $100 reduces national saving by about $75, and that $75 reduction 
in national saving is reflected in a $25 increase in borrowing from abroad and a $50 reduction in domestic investment 
(Rubin et al., 2004).  
8
 According to Gale and Orszag (2003) studies incorporating expectations of future deficits tend to find economically 
and statistically significant connections between anticipated deficits and current interest rates. 
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relatively minor effect and becomes positive once the debt ratio overcomes a given threshold. They also 
show that a deterioration of public finances abroad negatively affects the national interest rates thus 
confirming that the OECD financial markets are sufficiently integrated.  
 
 
3.   THE MODEL 
We consider an international economy comprising n≥2 national economies in discrete time over an 
infinite time horizon. In each country i, i=1,2,...,n, there are identical individuals and firms; for simplicity 
and without loss of generality, it is assumed that the structural parameters and the initial conditions of the n 
countries are equal. Agents' expectations are consistent with the actual processes followed by the relevant 
variables ("perfect foresight"). 
Individuals 
Individuals live for two periods, so that in each period t the country i population consists of two 
generations, the old and the young. For simplicity and without loss of generality, it is assumed that country i 
population remains constant. Moreover, the large number of individuals in each cohort living in i is 
normalized to unity. Finally, individuals' mobility across countries is ruled out. 
 Young individuals work full time, supply inelastically one unit of labor services and save a portion 
of their income for their old age. Old individuals do not work and live on the assets accumulated in the 
previous period. Both young and old individuals get utility from consuming a private good and from a public 
good provided by the government, which finances its provision by taxing individuals’ income.  
Thus, the period t budget constraint of a member of the young generation is: 
  it
y
itit
y
it SCW)-1( +≥τ ,              (1) 
where yitτ  is the tax rate on labor income, Wit is the wage rate, C it
y
 is the amount of private good consumed 
by a young individual and Sit are the savings (accumulated assets) of a young individual.  
The period t budget constraint of an old individual is:  
                          
o
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where oitτ  is the tax rate on the gross return on assets, rt is the “world” market (net) rate of return on assets 
and C it
o
 is the amount of private good consumed by an old individual. 
 The lifetime utility of a young individual located in country i is assumed to be given by  
10  0,  )],ln(G)C[ln()ln(G)Cln(u 1ito 1itit
y
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y
it ≤<>+++= ++ θγγθγ ,  (3a) 
where Git is the public good and θ is a time-preference parameter. Note that individuals have no altruistic 
motivation in favor of their children. Thus, a young  individual solves yitC,C
uMax
o
1it
y
it +
, subject to (1) and (2).   
 Consistently with (3a), the utility of an old individual located in country i is given by 
)ln(G)Cln(u itoitoit γ+= .    (3b) 
Firms  
 Firms act competitively. The large number of firms operating in country i is normalized to unity. All 
firms produce a single product according to the constant-returns-to-scale technology:  
10  ,KL Q -1ititit <<= ααα ,                   (4) 
where Qit is the output  of country i in period t, Lit is labor employed in country i, and Kit is physical capital 
rent by firms of country i. In each t, the representative firm located in i chooses Lit and Kit so as to 
maximize its profits: 
itititit
-1
ititK,L
KR-LW-KL max
itit
αα
,                 (5) 
where Rit is the market rental rate on capital paid by firms of i in period t. Notice that the price of the 
unique good produced in the economy is normalized to one. 
Fiscal authorities’ budget constraints 
In each t, the fiscal authority of country i must satisfy its budget constraint: 
it
y
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o
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where Bit is the public debt at the beginning of period t. Moreover, each national authority must satisfy the 
solvency condition:  
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Objectives of fiscal authorities caring only about the welfare of the living (and voting!) generations 
In the absence of intergenerational altruism on the part of individuals, it is realistic that each 
national government is sensitive only to the interests of the living (and voting!) generations located in its 
own country. However, even if national governments are only concerned with their re-election and care only 
about the welfare of the living generations, young individuals are supposed to be rational and perfectly 
aware of the consequences of current policies’ for their future well-being. Therefore, the relevant benchmark 
for the analysis is the case in which the entire lifetime well-being of the young generations enters the 
authorities’ objective function together with the utility of the old cohorts. This amounts to say that in period 
t the objective of each national government is to maximize 
y
it
o
itit )u-(1uU ξξ += , 0<ξ<1,        (7) 
where the parameter ξ measures the weight assigned to the old cohort's utility in the social welfare function. 
Note that (7) implies that the old-age well-being of the generation which is young in t enters as an argument 
of the social welfare function both in t and in t+1. This captures the fact that the young generation is 
concerned also about its future well-being and in each period a national government takes care of the 
concerns of both the old and the young generation.  
Objectives of fiscal authorities caring also about the welfare of the future (and not yet voting!) generations 
Suppose now that in each country the fiscal policy were determined taking care not only of the 
concerns of the living generations, but also of the interests of the not yet born generations. In this case, we 
model the behavior of the fiscal authority as if its objective were to maximize  

∞
=ts
is
t-s Uθ ,                            (8) 
where the authority discounts the future social welfare at the same rate at which young individuals discount 
their future utilities.  
 

Market-clearing conditions 
One has equilibrium in each national labor market when the wage is such that firms desire to hire all 
available workers: 
L it = 1.      (9) 
The “world” market for the single product is perfectly competitive. Assuming for simplicity that 
capital fully depreciates after one period, equilibrium in this market requires that 
,KCCQ 1totytt +++=     (10) 
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and K0 given.  
Similarly, the “world” asset market is perfectly integrated. Thus, equilibrium in the “world” asset 
market requires that  
 1-ttt SKB =+ .                   (11) 
where 
=
=
n
1i
itt BB and 
=
=
n
1i
itt SS .   
Given that capital is perfectly mobile, (11) implies that 
R it =1 + rt .                                         (12) 
Private sector equilibrium as a function of the tax rates 
Optimizing behavior on the part of individuals implies: 
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Optimizing behavior on the part of firms and equilibrium in national labor markets and in the 
internationally integrated capital market imply: 
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Equations (15) and (16) imply that the “world” capital stock is evenly distributed among countries 
even if the countries may differ with respect to their national savings9. This is due to the fact that the ability 
of each country to attract capital depends only on the parameter α determining the capital share of national 
income. Since this parameter is assumed to be equal across countries, possible differences in national tax 
rates affect the after-tax income of households leaving unchanged the firms' labor and capital cost, which 
depend on α  and on the installed stock of capital. Having the same capital stock, one can see from (15) that 
all countries have the same equilibrium wage. Moreover, from (11), (13) and (15) we obtain:  
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Given (17), the change in Kt+1 due to a marginal increment in yitτ  is: 
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while the change in Kt+1 due to a marginal increment in Bit+1 is: 
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4. NON-COOPERATIVE VERSUS COOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIUM UNDER AUTHORITIES’ 
SHORT-TERMISM 
As a national government cares only about the welfare of the living generations located in 
its own country, it is worth to emphasize that each government has full control only on its current 
fiscal policy since the future governments will respond to the interest of the generations then living. 
Moreover, all agents are perfectly aware that the fiscal policy of each country generates externalities 
affecting the welfare of the individuals living in other countries. Thus, in each period, young individuals 
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make their saving decisions knowing the current policies of the authorities and anticipating correctly next-
period fiscal policies. In their turn, the authorities fully endogeneize the optimal reactions of private agents 
to their policies. 
 Since national fiscal policies have spillover effects affecting the welfare of foreign individuals, 
national fiscal policies are interdependent. Therefore, the authorities’ short-termism is consistent with two 
alternative frameworks depending on whether fiscal policies are determined by each government in full 
autonomy (non-cooperative equilibrium) or by some institutional arrangement (a “Pact”) permitting a 
credible commitment on the part of each fiscal authority to follow those policies that are determined 
collectively by all the governments (cooperative solution).   
Game among national governments  
As each national authority acts in full autonomy (without any international coordination), in every t 
it solves:  
itUMax
itω
,                       (19) 
where { }it,oit1it,yitit G,B ττω += , subject to (6), Kt, Bit and Sit-1 given, taking into account the optimizing 
behavior of private agents, taking as given the current fiscal policies of the other countries and anticipating 
correctly the future fiscal policies of all countries. A Nash-Cournot (subgame-perfect) equilibrium path of 
this game among national authorities is characterized by a n-tuple of sequences 
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*
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maximizing (19) and the future (Nash-Cournot) equilibrium policies of all countries.                               
Knowing consumption, savings, wages, interest rate and capital stock as functions of the authorities’ 
fiscal policies, one can derive the equilibrium policy rules of the national authorities by backward induction 
(see the Appendix). Along the (subgame-perfect) equilibrium path, in each t an interior solution to the 
problem of the government i must satisfy the following set of conditions: 
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where λi is a Lagrange multiplier. By solving (20) and eliminating λi, one can obtain the equilibrium policy 
rules of the government i: 
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Given (17), (21a ) and (21b), the “world” stock of capital evolves according to 
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thus implying that at steady state the “world” stock of capital is  
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 Notice that the debt-to-GDP ratio increases with the number of countries n (see equation (21b)), 
while the steady-state stock of capital of each country decreases with n (see equation (23)): as in other 
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models of inter-country fiscal spillovers (e.g. see Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1999), the individual incentive to 
cut the deficit diminishes with the number of countries, since the effect of an unilateral reduction in debt on 
the common capital stock is only “1 over n”.  
International coordination (“collusion” among governments) 
 As the fiscal policies are determined cooperatively by the national governments, the domestic 
policies’ externalities affecting the welfare of foreign individuals are internalized. In the presence of an 
institutional arrangement making credible the governments’ commitments to follow the policies that are 
determined cooperatively, it is as if the fiscal policies were decided in every t by maximizing the summation 
of the national authorities’ objectives:   

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UMax
nt2t1t ωωω
     (24) 
subject to (6), taking into account the optimizing behavior of private agents and anticipating correctly the 
future fiscal policies, Kt, B1t, B2t,…,Bnt and S1t-1, S2t-1,…,Snt-1 given. An equilibrium path is characterized 
by a n-tuple of sequences { } { } { }∞
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the optimal policies determined cooperatively in the future. Differently than in the previous scenario, 
national tax rates and government borrowing are determined by considering also the effects that national 
fiscal policies cause on the lifetime utilities of the foreign residents because of their impact on the “world” 
capital accumulation. Therefore, while conditions (20c)-(20e) are still holding, conditions (20a) and (20b) 
become, respectively (see the Appendix), 
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By solving the system consisting of (20c)-(20e), (25a) and (25b) (and by eliminating λi), one can 
obtain the policy rules that each national authority must follow along a cooperative equilibrium path: 
 
2
[ ])-1)(-1(1)1(
))(1-1(
-1**y**yit αξθαγ
θξ
ττ
++
+
== ,           (26a) 
[ ]
α
αξθγ
γαξθ -1t** 1t**
1it
n
K
)-1)(-1(1)1(
)])(1-(1-)[1-1(
n
B
B 





++
+
==
+
+ ,  (26b) 
[ ])-1)(-1(1
n
BK)n-1)(1(
K
-1
tt
t**o
it
αξθαγ
ξ
τ
+




 +
+
= ,             (26c) 
[ ]
α
αξθγ
γ -1t**
it
n
K
)-1)(-1(1)1(G 




++
= .                 (26d) 
Given (17), (26a ) and (26b), the “world” stock of capital evolves according to 
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thus implying that at steady state the “world” stock of capital is  
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Comparing the two equilibrium paths 
 A possible shift from the non-cooperative to the cooperative equilibrium has both short-term and 
long-term implications. We summarize the effects of this shift into two propositions. 
Proposition 1: If in period t the economy moves from the non-cooperative to the cooperative equilibrium, 
each national government reduces its fiscal deficit by raising the tax rates and diminishing the expenditures 
as a fraction of the GDP, thus lowering the public debt-GDP ratio. This boosts capital accumulation and has 
a positive effect on the welfare functions maximized by the national governments. However, this shift does 
not determine a Pareto improvement, since the generation that is old in t is worse off. 
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Proof:  One can check that *y**y ττ > , and—given Kt and Bit—one can check that *oit**oit ττ > , *it**it GG < ,  
*
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1it BB ++ < , 
*
1t
**
1t KK ++ > ,
 
*
it
**
it UU > ,
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it
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*o
it
**o
it uu < .
      
Proposition 2: The boosting effect on capital accumulation of the shift from the non-cooperative to the 
cooperative equilibrium determines in the long run an increase in the consumption of all generations and in 
the governments’ provision of the public good, thus raising the individuals’ lifetime utility. 
Proof:  One can check that at steady state K**>K*, *y**y CC > , *o**o CC > , G**>G*, *y**y uu > ,  
*o**o uu >  and U**>U*. 
Enforcement of the cooperative equilibrium 
 It is apparent that each national fiscal policy maker has an incentive to act as a free rider, namely to 
behave non-cooperatively while the other policy makers continue to behave cooperatively. In this case, 
indeed, the deviating government could enjoy the benefits of the tighter fiscal policies of the other countries 
in terms of increased capital accumulation and lower interest rate in the “world” economy, without paying 
any cost in terms of unpopular tax increases and expenditure cuts. Obviously, symmetry among governments 
makes the temptation to act as a free rider common to all governments. Therefore, cooperative behavior on 
the part of the national governments can be an equilibrium only if there is a credible enforcement 
mechanism. Moreover, in this context, it cannot work the informal enforcement mechanism typical of an 
infinitely repeated game, where a player abstains from behaving non-cooperatively because of the threat of 
other players’ retaliation in future periods. Indeed, this mechanism is unfeasible because of the short time 
horizon of each government. This creates the necessity of a formal arrangement (a “Pact”) according to 
which all governments commit themselves to comply with some fiscal constraints and to punish those of 
them that do not respect the “Pact”. This commitment can be credible since the respect of the “Pact” by 
everybody is in the common interest of all governments (as a matter of fact, i  UU *it**it ∀> ).  
In the light of this conclusion, we do not elaborate on the specific design of a mechanism for the 
enforcement of the fiscal cooperation among governments, since our scope is to show that budget rules 
aimed at avoiding the negative externalities that issuing too much debt generates on foreign governments 
 
4
can be credibly enforced even if the authority of last resort in matter of certification and punishment of 
defiant behavior is an expression of the incumbent governments. One could also argue that the reform of the 
SGP went in the direction to make it a mere instrument of intergovernmental cooperation of this kind, thus 
depriving it of its more ambitious objectives in terms of prevention of fiscal short-termism. In this sense, one 
may maintain that these less ambitious objectives are more consistent with an enforcement mechanism 
assigning ultimate powers to the incumbent governments. 
 
5. THE EQUILIBRIUM EMERGING AS THE FISCAL AUTHORITIES CARE ABOUT LONG-
TERM WELFARE  
National fiscal policies have spillover effects on the welfare of foreign residents also when they are 
determined by authorities caring about the utilities of both the living and the future generations. However, to 
save space, we omit here to treat the case when each national authority acts in full autonomy in order to 
maximize (8), since it is straightforward that as in the previous section each national authority can do better 
by cooperating with the other national authorities. Hence, let us assume that the fiscal policies are decided in 
every t by taking care of the interests of the future generations and by maximizing the summation of the 
national authorities’ objectives:   
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subject to (6), taking into account the optimizing behavior of private agents, Kt, B1t, B2t,…,Bnt and S1t-1, 
S2t-1,…,Snt-1 given. 
Differently than in the solution to (24), national tax rates and government borrowing are determined 
by considering also the effects that national fiscal policies cause on the lifetime utilities of the not-yet born 
individuals because of their impact on the “world” capital accumulation. Therefore, while conditions (20c)-
(20e) are still holding, conditions (20a) and (20b) become, respectively (see the Appendix), 
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By solving the system consisting of (20c)-(20e), (30a) and (30b) (and by eliminating λi), one can 
obtain the policy rules that each national authority must adopt along a cooperative-equilibrium path where 
also the interests of the future generations are taken into account: 
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Given (17), (31a ) and (31b), the stock of capital evolves according to 
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thus implying that the steady-state stock of capital is  
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Comparing the two paths emerging when the national authorities cooperate 
 Also a possible shift from the cooperative equilibrium emerging when the fiscal authorities care 
only about the utilities of the living generations to the cooperative equilibrium emerging when the fiscal 
authorities care also about the welfare of the future generations has both short-term and long-term 
implications. We summarize the effects of this shift into two propositions. 
Proposition 3: If in period t the economy moves from the cooperative equilibrium emerging when only the 
interests of the living generations are taken into account to the cooperative equilibrium emerging when also 
                                                          
.		56			, #	 #
		1	55777
 

the interests of the future generations are considered, each national authority reduces its fiscal deficit by 
raising the tax rates and diminishing the expenditures as a fraction of the GDP, thus lowering the public 
debt-GDP ratio. This boosts capital accumulation but has a negative effect on current social welfare.  
Proof:  One can check that **y***y ττ > , and—given Kt and Bit—one can check that **oit***oit ττ > , 
**
it
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**
1it
***
1it BB ++ < , 
**
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**
it
***
it UU <   and **oit
***o
it uu < .      
Proposition 4: The boosting effect on capital accumulation of a shift from the cooperative equilibrium 
emerging under short-termism to the cooperative equilibrium emerging when the authorities care also about 
the interests of the future generations determines in the long run an increase in the consumption of all 
generations and in the governments’ provision of the public good, thus raising the individuals’ lifetime 
utility. 
Proof:  One can check that at steady state K***>K**, **y***y CC > , **o***o CC > , G***>G**, 
**y***y
uu > ,  **o***o uu >  and U***>U**. 
Enforcement of the cooperative equilibrium emerging when the fiscal authorities care also about the future 
generations 
 It is apparent that national governments maximizing the welfare of the living generations, i.e. 
maximizing Uit, would never enforce a “Pact” dictating fiscal policies that lower their objective functions 
below the level that they could reach by respecting softer fiscal constraints (as a matter of fact, 
i  UU **it
***
it ∀< ). Facing such a “Pact”, national governments would collude for not fully respecting it. This 
is true in spite of the fact that this tighter “Pact” would lead in the long run to a welfare improvement 
(U***>U**). In other words, a “Pact” imposing fiscal policies that are optimal from a long-term perspective 
cannot be credibly enforced by national governments having shorter-term points of view. This more 
ambitious “Pact” could be credibly enforced by an authority independent of the national governments, 
having as its mission the implementation of guidelines binding for all fiscal authorities and endowed with 
the powers for imposing the respect of these guidelines.  
 
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These conclusions may help explaining why incumbent governments in possession of ultimate 
powers in matter of enforcement colluded successfully for not respecting the tighter interpretation of the 
SGP. 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
As Buiter states in his “Ninth Commandment” for a fiscal rule in the E(M)U: “For rules to be 
credible, one of two conditions must be met: Either the rules are self-enforcing, or they are enforced 
consistently, through a combination of sticks and carrots, by an external agent” (Buiter, 2003, p.96). This 
paper intended to show that the credibility problem of the SGP followed from the fact that in its formulation 
and functioning neither of these conditions were met. Consistently with this diagnosis, Wyplosz (2002) 
proposed of delegating to a Fiscal Policy Committee independent of national governments the responsibility 
and the power of setting and enforce the fiscal guidelines to be followed by all member countries, leaving 
the more political allocative and distributive targets to national governments. It was very unlikely that many 
European governments were willing to surrender their sovereignty in these matters to such a body. As a 
matter of fact, recent events have shown that more ambitious objectives are unrealistic and that for any 
practical purposes the SGP has to be intended solely as an arrangement for permitting some coordination 
and cooperation among national governments with full control over their fiscal policy. Also this conclusion, 
indeed, is consistent with the spirit of this paper.  
The analysis of the paper was conducted within a very stylized framework so as to achieve neat 
results and not to dim their derivations with unnecessary complications. However, an extension to which it 
would be worth to devote further work amounts of differentiating the countries with respect to their initial 
conditions and size.   
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APPENDIX 
 
1 The dynamic game among national governments 
Knowing consumption, savings, wages, “world” interest rate and capital stock as functions of the 
authorities’ fiscal policies, one can derive the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game played when each 
national authority acts independently by supposing that there is a final period T and by solving it backwards 
period by period. The problem to be solved in T by the authority i is the following: 
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Note that KT+1=0, BiT+1=0 and SiT=0 ∀i: as long as the impact of the current fiscal policy on next-period 
capital stock does not enter the authorities' decision problem (since period T is assumed to be the last of the 
economy's history), it makes no difference whether the fiscal policies are decided in full autonomy or with 
international coordination (there is no interdependence among national policies).13 Assuming symmetry 
across countries (B1T=B2T=…=BnT and  S1T-1=S2T-1=…=SnT-1), the conditions to be satisfied for an 
interior solution in T are: 
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where λi is a Lagrange multiplier. By solving (A2) and eliminating λi, one can obtain the equilibrium policy 
rules of a national government in period T: 
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The problem to be solved in T-1 by each national authority caring only about the well-being of the 
living generations is the following:  
                                                          
13
 For the same reason, in T it makes no difference whether the authorities cares only of the utilities about the living 
generations or also about the utilities of the future generations.  
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the policies of all other authorities operating in T-1, KT-1, BiT-1 and SiT-2 given, and where KT is given by 
(17) (with t=T-1). Note that in period T-1, differently than in T, each national authority must take into 
account also the impact that its current policies have on the lifetime utility of its living citizens’ via its effect 
on next-period “world” capital stock. This creates an interdependence among national policies. Assuming 
again symmetry across countries, the conditions to be satisfied for an interior solution in T-1 are given by 
(20) (with t=T-1), from which one can derive the optimal response functions of the n countries. A Nash-
Cournot equilibrium of the game in which the national authorities are involved in period T-1 is a fixed point 
in the space of the n-countries’ response functions. One can check that this fixed point is unique and solve 
(20) for the equilibrium policy rules of the national governments in T-1 (by exploiting the fact that under 
symmetry these policy rules are the same for all countries). Hence, one obtains (21) (with t=T-1).  
The problem to be solved in T-2 by each national authority caring only about the well-being of the 
living generations is the following:  
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given the policies of all other authorities operating in T-2, KT-2, BiT-2 and SiT-3 given, and where KT-1 is 
given by (17) (with t=T-2). Assuming again symmetry across countries, the conditions to be satisfied for an 
interior solution in T-2 are still given by (20) (with t=T-2), thus obtaining the policy rules (21) (with t=T-2). 
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Iterating this procedure j-times and letting ∞→∞→ j and T , one still obtains the (time-invariant) 
equilibrium rules (21).  
2 Cooperation among national governments 
To derive the unique equilibrium path of this “world” economy when there is cooperation among 
national governments, namely when the fiscal policy are determined by maximizing (24), suppose again that 
T is the final period of the economy. In T there is no interdependence among national policies, and the 
equilibrium policy rules are still given by (A2). In contrast, the first-order conditions to be satisfied for a 
maximum when the national governments collude in T-1 are not the same as in the absence of coordination. 
Indeed, the problem to be solved in T-1 when the national governments cooperate is the following:  
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KT-1, B1T-1, B2T-1,…, BnT-1,  and S1T-2, S2T-2, …, SnT-2  given, and where KT is given by (17) (with t=T-1). 
Assuming symmetry across countries (B1T-1=B2T-1=…=BnT-1 and  S1T-2=S2T-2=…=SnT-2), the conditions 
to be satisfied for an interior solution in T-1 are given by (20c)-(20e) and by (25a)-(25b) (with t=T-1), thus 
obtaining the policy rules (26) (with t=T-1). 
The problem to be solved in T-2 when the national governments cooperate is the following:  
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KT-2, B1T-2, B2T-2,…, BnT-2,  and S1T-3, S2T-3, …, SnT-3  given, and where KT-1 is given by (17) (with t=T-2). 
Assuming again symmetry across countries, the conditions to be satisfied for an interior solution in T-2 are 
given by (20c)-(20e) and by (25a)-(25b) (with t=T-2), thus obtaining the policy rules (26) (with t=T-2). 
Iterating this procedure j-times and letting ∞→∞→ j and T , one still obtains the (time-invariant) 
equilibrium rules (26).  
3  Cooperation among fiscal authorities caring also about long-term welfare 
To derive the unique equilibrium path of this “world” economy when there is cooperation among 
fiscal authorities caring also about the future generation’s welfare, namely when the fiscal policy are 
determined by maximizing (29), suppose again that T is the final period of the economy. In T there is no 
future, and the equilibrium policy rules are still given by (A2). In contrast, the first-order conditions to be 
satisfied for a maximum in T-1 when the fiscal authorities care also about next-period social welfare are not 
the same as under authorities’ short-termism. Indeed, the problem to be solved in T-1 when fiscal authorities 
caring also about future welfare cooperate is the following:  
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subject to the same set of budget constraints as in (A6), KT-1, B1T-1, B2T-1,…, BnT-1,  and S1T-2, S2T-2, …, 
SnT-2  given, and where KT is given by (17) (with t=T-1). Continuing to assume symmetry across countries 
(B1T-1=B2T-1=…=BnT-1 and  S1T-2=S2T-2=…=SnT-2), the conditions to be satisfied for an interior solution 
in T-1 are given by (20c)-(20e) (with t=T-1), and by 
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By solving the system consisting of (20c)-(20e), (A9a) and (A9b) (and by eliminating λi), one can 
obtain the policy rules that each national authority must adopt in T-1: 
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Given (17), (A10a ) and (A10b), the stock of capital evolves according to 
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The problem to be solved in T-2 when fiscal authorities caring also about future periods’ welfare 
cooperate is the following:  
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subject to the same set of budget constraints as in (A7), KT-2, B1T-2, B2T-2,…, BnT-2,  and S1T-3, S2T-3, …, 
SnT-3  given, and where KT-1 is given by (17) (with t=T-2). Assuming again symmetry across countries, the 
conditions to be satisfied for an interior solution in T-2 are given by (20c)-(20e) (with t=T-2), and by  
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Iterating this procedure j-times, one can check that the conditions to be satisfied for an interior solution in  
T-j are given by (20c)-(20e) (with t=T-j), and by  
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Letting ∞→∞→ j and T , (A14a) and (A14b) converge, respectively, to (30a) and to (30b), from 
which—together with (20c)-(20e)—one can obtain the (time-invariant) policy rules (31).  
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